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Skewness, Tax Progression, and Demand for
Redistribution: Evidence from the UK
By Kirill Pogorelskiy and Stefan Traub∗
We introduce a skewness-based approach to measure tax progres-
sion and demand for redistribution. Adapting a novel, quantile-
based statistical measure of skewness to right-skewed income dis-
tributions, we uncover its political economy foundation, by simulta-
neously relating the same measure to the classical model of income
redistribution due to Meltzer and Richard (1981), to the Prospect
Of Upward Mobility (POUM) mechanism due to Be`nabou and Ok
(2001), and to the progressivity of a tax schedule. In an empiri-
cal analysis of UK income distributions in 1979 – 2013, we find
that skewness has increased over time, with the rich moving fur-
ther away from the median. While the magnitude of the increase
has remained small enough so that observed redistribution (or lack
thereof) could be consistent with POUM hypothesis, more recent
periods show an increase in tax progression.
JEL: D31, D63, H20, P16
Keywords: quantile skewness, inequality, voting over redistribu-
tion, tax progression
Most income distributions have the mean greater than the median, and so are
commonly called “right-skewed”, or “positively-skewed”, implying that they have
positive skewness. However, this relation does not always uphold for some of
the existing statistical measures of skewness, and the scholarly consensus is still
lacking as to which skewness measure should be generally used. For example,
the conventional measure of skewness is given by the standardized third central
moment. For very skewed distributions, this measure can be so sensitive to the
extreme tails of the distribution that it might be difficult to estimate accurately1,
and for some distributions like Pareto, it is only well-defined for certain parameter
values. This might be a particularly important concern for analyses that rely on
the very top incomes (e.g., Piketty and Saez (2006), Atkinson, Piketty and Saez
(2011), Alvaredo et al. (2013)).
In this paper, we make the first attempt to define an “economic” measure
of skewness, which takes into account the observed relation between the mean
and the median. We take a novel, quantile-based right-skew-sensitive measure
∗ Pogorelskiy: Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, U.K. Email:
k.pogorelskiy@warwick.ac.uk. Traub: Helmut-Schmidt-Universita¨t Hamburg, Germany. Email:
stefan.traub@hsu-hh.de. We express our warmest thanks to Christian Seidl, who got us started on
this project. We thank Marcus Berliant, Fabian Paetzel, and Christian Seidl for insightful comments
and discussions. We also thank seminar participants at Warwick CAGE and Florida State University.
1See, e.g., Hosking (1990) for a general approach to summarizing distribution statistics.
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2of skewness from statistics (Groeneveld and Meeden, 2009) and adapt it to eco-
nomic applications. We show that this, purely statistical, measure has a deep
political economy foundation by uncovering the relation of the same measure si-
multaneously to the classical general equilibrium model of income redistribution
in democracies due to Meltzer and Richard (1981), to the Prospect Of Upward
Mobility (POUM) mechanism due to Be`nabou and Ok (2001), and to the pro-
gressivity of a tax schedule. More specifically, we prove that 1) the mean over the
median inequality measure is a special case of the quantile measure of skewness;
2) if the quantile skewness is sufficiently small and positive, it is possible, for fixed
discount factor and the number of periods the tax remans in force, to construct a
social mobility function under which the majority winning tax is zero on a whim
of the median voter whose income is less than the mean, i.e., the POUM hypoth-
esis holds; and 3) under relatively mild conditions, a quantile-skewness-reducing
tax is progressive in the conventional sense.
In the empirical application, we apply the quantile measure of skewness to the
analysis of tax progression and demand for redistribution in the UK using nine
waves of Luxembourg Income Study data covering 1979 – 2013, and document
important patterns in the change of skewness over time. In particular, we show
that skewness has increased over time, with the rich moving further away from
the median. While the demand for redistribution has remained positive, the
magnitude of increase was small enough so that the observed redistribution (or
lack thereof) could be consistent with a deterministic POUM mechanism, in which
individuals expect a tax to persist for at least three years, and are sufficiently
patient. More recent periods, however, show an increase in tax progression.
After briefly describing the related literature in the following subsection, the
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the theory,
formally defining the skewness measure (Subsection I.B), exploring its proper-
ties (Subsection I.D), and relating it to political economy models (Subsections
I.E-I.F) and measuring tax progression (Subsection I.G). Section II describes the
application of the theory to the UK data, explaining the LIS data in Subsection
II.A and the analysis of the empirical patterns in Subsection II.B. Section III con-
cludes. All proofs are in Appendix A. Appendix B contains numerical simulations
for several standard distribution families: Lognormal, Exponential, and Pareto.
Additional data, figures, and tables are in Appendix C.
A. Related Literature
This paper is related to several major literatures. The quantile-based mea-
sure of skewness follows the approach from theoretical statistics (Groeneveld and
Meeden, 2009). This literature, starting from Groeneveld and Meeden (1984) and
Hosking (1990) generalized Bowley’s interquartile range (Bowley, 1901) propos-
ing a flexible approach to measure skewness, which, to the best of our knowledge,
3has not been used in economics2 and has been mostly studied in statistics us-
ing simulations and examples from standard distribution families. The family of
quantile measures proposed in Groeneveld and Meeden (2009) is parameterized
by a one-dimensional parameter which determines how far from the median the
value of skewness is computed. We take it as a starting point, and single out
the value of the parameter relevant for economic applications, by relating this
measure to the classical political economy models of majority voting over income
redistribution that build upon Meltzer and Richard (1981).3 The key prediction
from those models is a positive relation between the median voter’s preferred lin-
ear tax (the majority demand for redistribution) and the mean over the median
ratio. This relation has been tested empirically and experimentally by numerous
papers, so far having produced mixed results.4 We show that the mean over the
median ratio is a special case of the quantile measure of skewness.
One possible explanation for why income inequality has not resulted in a large-
scale redistribution lies in social mobility considerations. In particular, the POUM
hypothesis, formalized in Be`nabou and Ok (2001), suggests that the poor majority
may decide not to demand extreme taxes because they expect that they (or
their children) will become richer in the future, and so will be affected by these
redistributive policies.5 We show that the quantile skewness of the initial gross
income distribution has to be sufficiently small for the POUM mechanism to work,
if one is not allowed to vary the discount factor and the tax persistence period.6
We also relate to the voluminous literature on measuring tax progression (see
Seidl, Pogorelskiy and Traub (2013) for a book-length overview), by showing
that under convexity and non-positive taxation of the lowest incomes, a quantile-
skewness-reducing tax schedule is a conventionally progressive tax.
Finally, our empirical analysis uses the UK income distributions from nine waves
of LIS data, and here we relate to the applied literature on patterns in the change
of income inequality and tax progression over time. This literature has shown
that income inequality has risen in most OECD countries since the mid-1980s,
in particular, due to a faster increase of top incomes (OECD, 2008, 2011). For a
recent critical review of the literature on the evolution of top incomes over time
see Guvenen and Kaplan (2017).
2One exception is a recent paper of Kra¨mer and Dette (2016), who propose to define skewness in
terms of average net deprivation relative to the Gini coefficient. Their measure does not have a simple
interpretation and may fail to satisfy the convex ordering axiom (see Subsection I.D).
3The special case of this framework was first studied by Romer (1975) and Roberts (1977). The static
framework of Meltzer and Richard (1981) is extended to a dynamic setting in Alesina and Rodrik (1994)
and Persson and Tabellini (1994), relating redistribution to economic growth. See Persson and Tabellini
(2002) for an overview and related extensions.
4 See, e.g., Meltzer and Richard (1983), Krusell and R´ıos-Rull (1999), Rodr´ıguez (1999), Milanovic
(2000), Agranov and Palfrey (2015).
5Other relevant studies of social mobility include Piketty (1995), Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002),
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005), Agranov and Palfrey (2016).
6If one can freely vary these parameters, then for any finite and positive initial skewness it is possible
to construct a social transition function that delivers the POUM result, so the restriction on skewness
loses its bite.
4I. Theory
In this section, we describe a theoretical basis for our measure of quantile skew-
ness and uncover its relation to tax progression and demand for redistribution.
A. Notation
Let y denote gross income, distributed with cdf G on [ymin, ymax], where ymin >
0. Let x denote net income, distributed with cdf F on [xmin, xmax]. We assume
that G and F are unimodal, absolutely continuous, strictly monotone, and have
differentiable densities, g and f , positive everywhere on their respective supports.
It is understood that F is generated from G by applying a fixed tax schedule to
every income recipient. Let D ∈ {G,F} be an income distribution. For p ∈ [0, 1]
let D−1(p) := inf{z ∈ R|D(z) ≥ p} = µDp be the quantile function of D evaluated
at p. From our continuity and monotonicity assumptions, for every p ∈ [0, 1]
there is a unique income zp such that D(zp) = p. The median of distribution D
is given by µD := D−1(0.5).
B. A quantile measure of skewness
As we mentioned in the introduction, the real world income distributions are
ubiquitously, and sometimes to a very large degree, right-skewed, and an “eco-
nomic” measure of skewness must take this into account. Such an alternative
skewness measure, based on quantile ratios, was examined in a recent paper of
Groeneveld and Meeden (2009).7 This new measure does not require existence of
higher moments of a distribution and is sensitive to right-skewed distributions,
which becomes particularly useful in the analysis of tax progression and demand
redistribution, as discussed in more detail below.
To motivate this new measure of skewness, take an individual, Alice, with
median income µD and consider her relative income shortfall (RIS) in comparison
to a richer individual, Bob, with income µD1−p > µD for p ∈ (0, 0.5):
Relative Income Shortfall =
µD1−p − µD
µD
(1)
If Alice viewed Bob’s income as a reference point, she would be probably willing
to decrease this difference in incomes. If we assume that she cannot increase her
own income, then the only way this can be done is by decreasing Bob’s income
downwards. Bob’s income, however, is not the only reference point Alice might
have. Consider a poorer individual, Clark, with income µDp < µ
D. Alice’s relative
7Kotz and Seier (2009) describe a similar approach to define a kurtosis measure. Quantile measures
of skewness generalize the so-called Bowley coefficient (Bowley, 1901). See also Groeneveld and Meeden
(1984).
5income excess (RIE) in comparison to Clark is
Relative Income Excess =
µD − µDp
µD
(2)
If Alice viewed Clark’s income as a reference point (i.e., she had some sort of
social preference), she would be probably also willing to decrease this difference
in incomes. If we assume she is unwilling to decrease her own income to do this,
then the only way this can be done is by increasing Clark’s income upwards.
Thus if we put Alice in charge of income redistribution in the society, she could
kill two birds with one stone: by redistributing some of Bob’s income towards
Clark. This would result in a less right-skewed distribution. This procedure
also has a clear psychological interpretation: a typical survey question about
redistribution is how the government should redistribute income from the rich
to the poor.8 This puts the respondent in the middle of the perceived income
distribution, since she is unlikely to consider herself either very rich or very poor.
But what are the reference incomes then? One possibility is to think of “the
better-off” as a hypothetical person richer than oneself, and of “the less well-off”
as a hypothetical person poorer than oneself. The relative importance of the two
is precisely what our skewness measure captures.
Formally, we define a quantile-based measure of skewness λp(D) for D ∈ {F,G},
and a fixed skewness parameter p ∈ (0, 0.5) as follows:
Definition 1. Let
(3) λp(D) =
RIS
RIE
− 1 = µ
D
1−p − µD
µD − µDp
− 1
We say that D is skewed to the right, if λp(D) > 0. This is equivalent to having
D−1(1− p)−D−1(0.5) > D−1(0.5)−D−1(p)
C. Choosing the skewness parameter
The quantile measure of skewness depends on the value of the skewness param-
eter, p, which determines how far from the median income the reference incomes
are located. For p close to 0.5, the measure captures only the central part of
the distribution, and for p close to 0 the measure captures almost the entire
distribution and so becomes very sensitive to the tails.
Thus, the choice of p involves a tradeoff. For example, Groeneveld and Meeden
(2009) suggested to use p = 0.05, arguing that doing so excludes the absolute
8E.g., the British Social Attitudes Survey has been asking the following question for many years.
[On a scale from 1 to 5, how much do you agree with the following statement]: “Government should
redistribute income from the better-off to those who are less well-off.”
6extremes while capturing most of the distribution support. In economic applica-
tions, however, it makes less sense to choose a small p because reference incomes
are more likely to be located closer to one’s own income. This view also receives
support from social psychology: According to Festinger’s theory of social com-
parison processes, “[t]he tendency to compare oneself with some other specific
person decreases as the difference between his opinion or ability and one’s own
increases”, and “[g]iven a range of possible persons for comparison, someone close
to one’s own ability or opinion will be chosen for comparison” (Festinger, 1954,
p. 120–121). In Subsection I.E we show that there is a unique choice of p that is
determined by the demand for redistribution.
D. Properties of the quantile skewness measure
To distinguish between different skewness measures, van Zwet (1964) introduced
an axiomatic approach. We reformulate these axioms here as properties of λp(D)
for a fixed skewness parameter p ∈ (0, 0.5) and distribution D ∈ {F,G}.
To state the axioms formally, we will need just one more definition from van
Zwet (1964) (see also Groeneveld and Meeden (1984)).
Definition 2. We say that distribution G is at least as skewed to the right as
distribution F , if R := G−1 ◦ F is convex. In this case we write F <c G and say
that “F c-precedes G”, where c stands for convex ordering.
This definition says that a non-decreasing convex transformation of a random
variable should be skewness-increasing (and a concave transformation skewness-
reducing). If F <c G, it can be shown that Y is a convex function of X, and
their standardized cdfs cross exactly twice (Oja, 1981). This property is also the
driving force behind the famous social mobility model of Be`nabou and Ok (2001)
as explained in Subsection I.F. The list of axioms for a skewness measure follows.
(A1) [Convex Ordering]. if F <c G then λp(F ) ≤ λp(G)
(A2) [Translation and Scale Invariance]. λp(a+ bD) = λp(D) where b > 0, a
are constants.
(A3) [Symmetric Normalization]. λp(D) = 0 for a symmetric D.
(A4) [Antisymmetry]. λp(−D) = −λp(D)
Axiom (A1) is particularly important, since it introduces a partial ordering on
distributions. Some skewness measures, e.g., Pearson’s second skewness coefficient
3(y¯ − µ)/σ may violate this axiom. Groeneveld and Meeden (2009) showed that
λp satisfies (A1) − (A3), but not (A4). Hence we propose a slightly modified
axiom, (A4′).
(A4′) [Right-skew Sensitivity]. λp(−D) ≥ −λp(D)
7Proposition 1. λp(D) satisfies (A4
′) for all p ∈ (0, 0.5). If D is not symmetric,
λp(D) satisfies (A4
′) strictly for some p.
While we do not currently have a full axiomatic characterization of λp(D),
leaving it for future research, we provide in Appendix B numerical simulations
with examples from several distribution families: Lognormal, Exponential, and
Pareto, truncated to the support [ymin, ymax] of the gross income distribution,
in order to illustrate the properties of the quantile measure of skewness. We
assume a convex tax schedule with 50% of the total tax revenue redistributed as a
lump-sum transfer. We show how progressive taxation reduces quantile skewness
for all values of p as one moves from the gross to the net income distribution.
Interestingly, in those numerical examples, λp(D) is a convex and decreasing
function of p for D ∈ {F,G} and p ≥ 0.05.9
E. Skewness and Demand for Redistribution
It turns out that the quantile measure of skewness can be related to the “demand
for redistribution” in the classical theoretical framework of Meltzer and Richard
(1981).
The model in brief works as follows. There is a measure one of individuals,
who differ along a single characteristic (e.g., productivity). The individuals make
private choices (labor supply) taking the government policy (linear tax and lump-
sum transfers) as given. This generates induced preferences (indirect utility) over
taxes. With a linear tax, each individual’s preference for redistribution hinges on
their position relative to mean income: an individual with below-mean productiv-
ity receives below-mean income, so she would benefit from a linear redistribution
scheme and prefers a more redistributive tax schedule, subject to the deadweight
loss due to taxation. The concern about the deadweight loss prevents the poor
majority from setting the tax rate to 100%.10
With pairwise majority voting, which could be thought of as a result of two-
candidate electoral competition, the optimal tax policy hinges on the median
voter’s income. In particular, assuming a reasonably-behaved utility specification,
like the Stone-Geary utility from consumption c and leisure `, u(c, `) = ln(c+γ)+
α ln(`), which has been widely used in empirical analyses, the model predicts that
the purely redistributive expenditure is positively correlated with mG := y¯/µG,
the ratio of the mean income to the median income, also called the Meltzer-
Richard inequality measure (Meltzer and Richard, 1981, 1983).11
9Lognormal distribution behaves differently for p < 0.05, so in general, λp(D) can behave non-
monotonically as a function of p.
10The linear tax assumption is restrictive but standard in this literature, since it makes it possible to
use the median-voter theorem to determine the majority-preferred equilibrium tax rate. Even with the
linear tax, the tax-and-transfer schedule is de facto progressive, since the rich are getting back a smaller
fraction of their income as lump-sum transfers. As explained in Subsection I.G, the application of the
quantile measure of skewness to tax progression does not rely on linear tax at all.
11There are additional implicit assumptions required for this interpretation, e.g., that the median
voter has median income. Depending on voter turnout, this may not be the case.
8We will now relate the Meltzer-Richard ratio to our skewness measure. Notice
first, that from (3), for any distribution D and any p ∈ (0, 0.5) we can express
the median as follows.
(4) µD =
µD1−p + µDp (λp(D) + 1)
λp(D) + 2
Consider now a right-skewed gross income distribution. By our regularity as-
sumptions, there exists a p¯ ∈ [0, 0.5) such that y¯ = G−1(1 − p¯). That is, the
mean gross income is given by a quantile to the right of the median income, and
for very right-skewed distributions, this 1 − p¯ quantile will be closer to the top
incomes than to the median income. Thus,
(5) p¯ := 1−G(y¯)
We can now rewrite (4) as follows:
µG =
y¯ + µGp¯ (λp¯(G) + 1)
λp¯(G) + 2
= µGp¯ +
y¯ − µGp¯
λp¯(G) + 2
Dividing both sides by a positive median income, µG, and re-arranging terms,
we obtain
(6) mG = (λp¯(G) + 1)
(
1− µ
G
p¯
µG
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=RIE
+1
Hence the Meltzer-Richard ratio is a special case of the quantile measure of skew-
ness, when evaluated at p¯. This justifies our focus on the skewness measure
evaluated at a particular value of p = p¯ in the remainder of the paper. The
scaling factor in (6),
(
1− µGp¯
µG
)
, is precisely the median voter’s relative income
excess, see (2). For right-skewed distributions, λp¯(G) > 0 and
µGp¯
µG
< 1. If a
right-skewed distribution becomes more right-skewed, both λp¯ and
µGp¯
µG
increase,
with
µGp¯
µG
remaining less than 1.
Under the additional assumption that partial elasticites of mean income with
respect to taxes and lump-sum transfers are constant, Meltzer and Richard (1981)
show that the optimal tax for the voter with the median income is increasing in
mG. Together with (6), this implies that an increase in quantile skewness due to
a decrease in RIE may not affect the equilibrium tax rate; only an increase in
skewness due to RIS should lead to an increase in the equilibrium tax.
9F. Quantile skewness and the prospect of upward mobility
In this section we describe an even more intimate relation that exists between
the quantile measure of skewness and the POUM hypothesis. The POUM ar-
gues that the poor majority may decide not to demand extreme taxes because
they expect to have incomes greater than the mean in the future, and so will be
adversely affected by these redistributive policies. This argument may seem para-
doxical, because, clearly, the majority of the population cannot all become richer
than the mean. However, Be`nabou and Ok (2001), by means of a simple social
mobility model, demonstrate how the POUM hypothesis can actually hold with
fully rational economic agents. The key model assumptions concern concavity of
the expected transition function, which maps today’s incomes to future incomes,
and right-skewness of the initial income distribution.
Suppose that all individuals are risk-neutral, and starting from the initial in-
come distribution, G, a linear redistribution scheme rt(y) := (1 − t)y + ty¯ is ap-
plied to each individual’s gross income y, subject to the budget-balance condition:
y¯ =
∫ ymax
ymin
rt(y)dG(y). A policy of no redistribution (“laissez-faire”) is given by
r0, and a full redistribution policy is given by r1. Suppose a tax schedule is chosen
at date 0 to remain in force for T ≥ 1 periods, starting from period 0, and all indi-
viduals discount the future with the same discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1]. Individuals’
gross income in period 0 comes from distribution G, and for any period τ > 0 it is
obtained by applying the same transition function s : [ymin, ymax]→ [ymin, ymax],
to the previous period gross income. s is assumed to be a continuous, strictly
increasing, and concave but not affine transition function (denote the class of such
functions S).12 So yτ = s(yτ−1) ≡ (s(y))τ , τ = 1, . . . , T . Thus, we momentarily
step out of the general equilibrium framework of Meltzer and Richard (1981), ig-
noring deadweight losses from redistribution and optimal labor supply decisions,
and model the change in the income distribution as a primitive.13
Notice that the income distribution in any period τ > 0 is Fτ = Fτ−1◦s−1. Since
s is concave, s−1 ≡ (Fτ−1)−1 ◦Fτ is convex. Therefore, Fτ <c Fτ−1. Given axiom
(A1) of a skewness measure, each period income distribution is less right-skewed
than the previous one. Since the convex ordering is transitive (e.g., Oja (1981,
Theorem 5.1)), Fτ <c G. So if the transition function is applied sufficiently many
times, the demand for redistribution that may exist in the initial distribution will
disappear as the mean income will approach the median or even go below that.
Therefore, depending on δ (how patient all individuals are), they may vote against
redistribution already in period 0. This is how the basic POUM mechanism works.
Denote the conditional mean gross income of the poorer population half as
E
[
Y |Y ≤ µG] ≡ 2 ∫ µGymin ydG(y). Building on Be`nabou and Ok (2001, Theorem
12In general, s can be stochastic, and depend on individual income shocks, as described in Be`nabou
and Ok (2001). We will only consider deterministic transition functions here.
13This departure is mainly for simplicity: one could add deadweight losses and endogenize transition
functions, and under specific assumptions about the income distribution, still obtain the POUM result.
See Be`nabou (2000) and Agranov and Palfrey (2016).
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2), we can prove the following
Proposition 2. Let G be right-skewed, p¯ defined by (5), and suppose that
(7) µGp¯ ≥ E
[
Y |Y ≤ µG] .
If, for given δ and T ,
(8) λp¯(G) <
δ(3− δT )− 2
2(1− δ)
then there exists a transition function s ∈ S such that the median voter is indif-
ferent between laissez-faire (zero tax) and full redistribution, everyone to the left
of the median strictly prefers full redistribution, and everyone to the right of the
median strictly prefers laissez-faire. For any integer T ′ > T , the majority-winning
tax becomes zero.
Proposition 2 says that for fixed δ and T , if the initial skewness is sufficiently
small but positive (and the conditional mean income is not too high), it is possible
to construct a continuous, strictly increasing, and concave but not affine transition
function under which the majority winning tax is zero on a whim of the median
voter, who is poorer than the mean. Be`nabou and Ok (2001, Theorem 2b) show
that for large enough T and δ close to 1, one can find a transition function
ensuring that the majority winning tax is zero for any initial positive skewness,
i.e., the POUM argument indeed may prevent redistribution. Their conclusion
carries over in full in our case – for sufficiently large T and δ close to 1, (7)-(8) are
not required for the POUM mechanism.14 However, for fixed (and possibly, small)
δ and T , the initial skewness must be sufficiently small for the construction in the
proof to work. For example, if tax persists for T = 3 years and δ ≥ 0.95, λp¯(G)
is small enough for consistency with POUM in terms of satisfying inequality (8),
in every LIS wave we used (see Section II.A). If T = 4 years, it is sufficient for
full consistency to have δ ≥ 0.85.
G. Quantile skewness and tax progression
In this section we demonstrate the connection between the quantile measure of
skewness and the well-known measures of tax progression. Suppose F c-precedes
G, as defined in Section I.D. Then R = G−1 ◦ F is convex. It will be more
convenient to work with the inverse of R. Define H := F−1 ◦ G, then H is
concave whenever R is convex. Hence we can equivalently write that F <c G if
H is concave. Notice that we have a one-to-one relation between gross and net
incomes: for any x ∈ [xmin, xmax] we have x = H(y) for some y ∈ [ymin, ymax].
14In fact, as mentioned in Be`nabou and Ok (2001), the reason that T and δ have to be large enough
in their Theorem 2b is because the chosen redistribution scheme is applied already in period 0. We show
that an alternative to this is to have a sufficiently small initial skewness.
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This is equivalent to writing x = y − (y −H(y))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:t(y)
= y − t(y). Hence, the tax-and-
transfer schedule, given by t(y), is a convex function. We are going to refer to
t(y) as a tax schedule, with the understanding that redistributive transfers may
be also included in t(y). In order to warrant such an interpretation, we impose
an additional “no re-ranking” condition, assumed to hold throughout the paper.
Assumption 1. The marginal tax rate, t′(y), satisfies 0 ≤ t′(y) ≤ 1 for all
y ∈ [ymin, ymax].
Under this additional assumption, we can formally define the conventional tax
progressivity.
Definition 3. (Conventional progression) A tax schedule t(y) is progressive, if
the average tax rate, t(y)/y, is increasing in y.
Our next definition relates tax progression to a reduction in skewness of the net
income distribution as compared to the gross income distribution.
Definition 4. (Progression in terms of skewness). A tax schedule is progressive
in terms of skewness, if λp¯(G)− λp¯(F ) > 0 for p¯ defined in (5).
The idea behind this definition is that a progressive tax schedule should be
reducing inequality and thus lowering the demand for redistribution. Loosely
speaking, the median voter in the gross income distribution should have a higher
ideal tax rate than the median voter in the net income distribution.15
It is important to understand the relation between progressivity according to
the above two definitions and convexity of the tax schedule, as the following
proposition shows.
Proposition 3. Suppose tax schedule t is convex, then the following holds: 1) t
is progressive in terms of skewness (Def. 4). 2) If, additionally, t(ymin) ≤ 0, then
t is progressive (Def. 3).
This result immediately implies
Corollary 1. Suppose tax schedule t is convex and t(ymin) ≤ 0. Then t is pro-
gressive by either definition of tax progression.
Hence under convexity, a skewness-reducing tax is progressive.
Concluding the discussion of the theoretical basis for the quantile measure of
skewness, we also state a definition of “more progressivity” in terms of skewness,
which allows one to compare different tax schedules operating on different income
distributions.
15 Of course, the tax rate for the net income distribution can only be hypothetically conceived, and
is not determined by the first order conditions in Meltzer and Richard (1981, Eq (13)). For the sake of
comparability, p¯ is obtained using the gross income distribution for both gross and net quantile measures
of skewness in Definition 4.
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Definition 5. We say that (F1, G1) is more progressive than (F2, G2), if λp¯1(G1)−
λp¯1(F1) ≥ λp¯2(G2)− λp¯2(F2) for p¯i defined in (5) for distribution Gi, i = 1, 2.
In words, a more progressive tax reduces gross distribution skewness relative
to net distribution skewness more. This approach to comparing tax progression
across populations, which takes into account corresponding income distributions,
is an alternative to the one proposed in Seidl, Pogorelskiy and Traub (2013).
Using Definition 5, we’ll be able to compare tax progressivity in the UK over
time.
II. An application to the UK data
In this section, we apply the quantile measure of skewness to an empirical
analysis of the UK data. Using the data on gross and net income distributions
in the UK stretching over several decades, we compute the quantile measure of
skewness and investigate the demand for linear redistribution, consistency with
the POUM hypothesis, and tax progression.
A. Data
Our empirical analysis resorts to micro data drawn from the Luxembourg In-
come Study database (LIS, 2011). It is a cross-national data archive located in
Luxembourg.16 Currently it includes micro data from about 50 countries, most
of which are OECD member states. The data sets are organized into ‘waves’ of
about five years each, starting with Wave I around 1980 and the most recent
being Wave IX (around 2013). The micro data from the different surveys is har-
monized and standardized by LIS in order to facilitate comparative research. In
the present paper, we apply the quantile measure of skewness to UK data only.
The UK datasets for Waves I to III originate from the Family Expenditure Survey
(FES), the Wave IV dataset originates from both FES and the Family Resources
Survey (FRS), and Waves V to IX rely on FRS data. The nine waves of UK data
correspond to the years 1979, 1986, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2007, 2010, and 2013.
We use LIS data instead of original survey data from the UK because we intend
to carry out comparative research in future works.
LIS reports several household income aggregates out of which we only employ
disposable household income (DHI), defined as gross income (HI) minus income
taxes (HXITI) and social security contributions (HXITS):
DHI = HI − (HXITI + HXITS). We do not consider indirect taxes in our anal-
yses. All observations are selected for which DHI > 0, HI > 0, HXITI ≥ 0
and HXTIS ≥ 0. The analysis is carried out at the household level as well as
for equivalized data. The household-level data are the original data provided by
16For more information about the LIS database see Smeeding (2004) and Atkinson (2004). A thorough
discussion of issues in the use of LIS micro data for measuring effective tax progression, such as re-ranking,
is provided by Seidl, Pogorelskiy and Traub (2013).
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LIS, weighed by household weights (HPOPWGT). These weights are intended
to secure representativeness of the results for the entire country population. For
individual-based analyses, equivalized data are used, which are obtained from the
household data as follows. First, all monetary variables are multiplied by the
Luxembourg equivalence scale n−0.5, where n represents the number of household
members (NPERS). Second, household weights are replaced by person weights
which are computed as NPERS×HPOPWGT.
Direct access to LIS micro data is not permitted. Hence, we wrote a program
in SPSS that computed µDp , D ∈ {G,F} for 20 equally spaced values of p in
the unit interval (i.e., twenty quantiles) and printed back these results for every
dataset, for both household and equivalized data. The program also computed
the 1 − p¯-quantiles and the p¯-quantiles for gross and net incomes, the quantile
measure of skewness evaluated at p¯ for gross incomes, and the mean of the net
income distribution (recall that the mean of the gross income distribution is given
by the 1 − p¯-quantile). The mean to the median ratio, the quantile measure of
skewness for each vigintile, and the conditional mean were then computed in a
spreadsheet.
B. Analysis
All analyses in this section are using household data only. Appendix C contains
figures for all LIS Waves for the UK using both household and equivalized data.
The data underlying all figures in this section can be found in Tables C1 – C6 in
Appendix C.
Figure 1 is based on the most recent LIS data for the UK (2013). The top panel
of Figure 1 depicts the gross (solid line) and net income (dashed line) density over
gross income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 19th vigintile of
gross income. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income quantiles at
p¯ (p¯-quantile), 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯ (mean), respectively. At the first
glance, it is clear that both the gross and the net income distribution are skewed
to the right. The median is to the left of the mean indicating that some demand
for redistribution is present, according to the Meltzer-Richard model. The relative
income shortfall (the distance between the right-most and the middle vertical line,
normalized by the median) is greater than the relative income excess (the distance
between the middle and the left-most vertical line, normalized by the median).
Thus, the gross income distribution is also skewed to the right according to the
quantile measure of skewness. A comparison of gross and net distributions shows
that some probability mass has been shifted to lower incomes by the tax-and-
transfer system.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 depicts the quantile measures of skewness, λp(G)
(solid line) and λp(F ) (dashed line) as functions of the skewness parameter p.
The vertical line represents p¯. Both quantile measures monotonically decrease in
p, indicating less skewness if measured closer to the median. For lower values of
p, we observe greater skewness of the gross income distribution. This also holds
14
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for the skewness measure evaluated at p = p¯. Since p¯ = 0.362 is closer to 0.5 than
to zero, the reference incomes for the median, µGp¯ and µ
G
1−p¯ ≡ y¯, are located in
the central parts of the distribution rather than its tails.
The household datasets between 1999 and 2013 show similar skewness patterns
(see Figures C5 – C8 in Appendix C). The earlier datasets (see Figures C1 – C4)
are a bit “bumpier”, showing multiple peaks. As a result, quantile skewness is
less pronounced.
Next, we document skewness patterns that arise over time in Figure 2.17 The
top panel of Figure 2 shows changes in the quantile measure of skewness over
time for gross (solid line) and net income (dashed line) distributions. Both lines
indicate a clear trend towards more skewness over time. In fact, they start from
values close to zero in 1979. Surprisingly, net incomes were more right-skewed
than gross incomes until the early 2000s. From then on, gross income distributions
became more right-skewed.
The middle panel shows the relation between quantile skewness of gross in-
come evaluated at p¯ (solid line, left y-axis) and the demand for redistribution in
terms of the mean over the median ratio featured in Meltzer and Richard (1981)
(dashed line, right y-axis). Both increase over time and their Pearson correlation
coefficient is 0.889. So, looking at these pre-tax measures, we can conclude that
the increase in quantile skewness is consistent with increased demand for redis-
tribution in the Meltzer-Richard framework. Note, however, that the skewness of
the net income distribution shows that the actual outcome of this redistribution
falls short of fulfilling these demands. As already mentioned, only in the later
LIS Waves is net income skewness lower than gross income skewness.
The bottom panel shows the median’s relative income excess (solid line) and
relative income shortfall (dashed line) over time (for gross incomes). This graph
allows us to disentangle the influence of RIE and RIS on the quantile measure of
skewness. We see that both started from the same value in 1979 and then RIS
increased more than RIE, giving rise to the overall increase in quantile skewness.
This means that those richer than the median income individual have moved fur-
ther away over time while those poorer than the median have kept their distance.
This pattern is also consistent with recent empirical evidence from the US, see
Guvenen and Kaplan (2017).
Next, we investigate consistency of our data with the POUM hypothesis. Fixing
δ and T , Proposition 2 shows that POUM holds if i) quantile skewness of gross
income is sufficiently small (see (8)) and, in addition, ii) the conditional mean
income amongst those poorer than the median does not exceed the p¯-quantile
(see (7)). Figure 3 illustrates ii) by comparing the p¯-quantile (solid line) with the
conditional mean income (dashed line) over time (for equivalized data see Figure
C19). The figure reveals that the conditional mean has been strictly smaller than
the p¯-quantile in every LIS Wave, so (7) holds. The gross income skewness in
condition i) varies between −0.029 and 0.314 (see Table C3 in Appendix C). The
17Figure C18 in Appendix C presents the same measures using equivalized data.
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right hand side of (8) is non-negative for T > 2 and δ > 0.815, and increases
fast in δ for fixed T . E.g., for T = 3 years and δ ≥ 0.94, it is greater than the
largest λp¯(G) in our data. Hence, the skewness of the gross income distribution
has been sufficiently small in order to prevent poor voters from renouncing income
redistribution in every LIS wave.
0
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15,000
20,000
25,000
1979 1986 1991 1995 1999 2004 2007 2010 2013
p-Quantile Conditional Mean-
Notes. Based on household data. p¯-quantile (solid line) versus conditional
mean (dashed line) over time.
Figure 3. : Condition (7) for POUM hypothesis holds in household data
Finally, we turn to changes in tax progression. Figure 4 shows the difference be-
tween the quantile skewness of gross and net incomes evaluated at p¯ over time.18
According to Definition 4, a positive (negative) difference indicates a progressive
(regressive) tax-and-transfer system. Moreover, positive (negative) pairwise dif-
ferences between two time periods indicate an increase (decrease) in the degree
of progression according to Definition 5. Between 1979 and 1999, we observe a
steady decline of progressivity, ending up in a regressive tax-and-transfer system
(from the perspective of the median income). After 1990, tax progression in-
creases. The “dip” in progression in 2010 could be due to abolishment of the 10%
starting rate and reduction in the basic rate from 22% to 20% in 2008-09.
III. Concluding remarks
Since the mid-1980s, developed countries have encountered a sharp rise in in-
come inequality (OECD, 2008, 2011). The tax-benefit systems of many OECD
countries have become more redistributive, but their effectiveness in reducing in-
come inequality declined. An important byproduct of these developments – the
18For equivalized data, see Figure C20 in Appendix C. Equivalized data show a few notable discrep-
ancies (although not in the overall trend), which could probably be due to re-ranking.
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pronounced increase in the skewness of OECD countries’ income distributions –
has been largely ignored in both scholarly and public debate.
In this paper, we put the spotlight back on the role of skewness in the dis-
tribution and redistribution of income and propose an “economic” measure of
skewness, which explicitly takes into account the right-skewness property of in-
come distributions. We take a novel, quantile-based right-skew-sensitive measure
of skewness from theoretical statistics (Groeneveld and Meeden, 2009) and adapt
it to public economics applications. We prove that it fulfils a number of desirable
axioms, the most important being convex ordering, which allows one to mean-
ingfully compare skewness between different distributions.19 We discover that
the quantile measure of skewness, evaluated at a certain quantile, has a deep
political economy foundation by uncovering the relation of the same measure si-
multaneously to the Meltzer-Richard model of voting over redistribution, to the
Be´nabou-Ok POUM mechanism, and to the progressivity of a tax schedule.
In the empirical application, we apply the quantile measure of skewness to
the analysis of tax progression and demand for redistribution in the UK using
nine waves of Luxembourg Income Study data covering 1979 – 2013. We show
that skewness has increased over time, with the rich moving further away from
the median. While the demand for redistribution has remained positive, the
magnitude of increase was small enough so that the observed redistribution (or
lack thereof) could be consistent with a deterministic POUM mechanism, in which
individuals expect a tax to persist for at least three years, and are sufficiently
19Developing a full axiomatic characterization of the quantile measure of skewness remains an impor-
tant direction for future research.
19
patient. More recent periods, however, show an increase in tax progression.
The quantile measure of skewness can be easily and robustly applied to other
datasets, and can become a natural alternative to popular inequality measures,
like the Gini coefficient and the ratio of the top to the bottom decile.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let
γp(D) :=
µD1−p + µDp − 2µD
µD1−p − µDp
This is a measure of skewness proposed in Groeneveld and Meeden (1984), where
they also show that γp(−D) = −γp(D) and γp(D) ∈ [−1, 1]. One can easily check
(Groeneveld and Meeden, 2009, p.4) that
λp(D) =
2γp(D)
1− γp(D)
Then using the properties of γp we can write
λp(−D) = 2γp(−D)
1− γp(−D) =
−2γp(D)
1 + γp(D)
≥ −2γp(D)
1− γp(D) ≡ −λp(D)
The last inequality holds with a strict sign as long as γp(D) 6= 0, but if D is not
symmetric, we cannot have γp(D) = 0 for all p ∈ (0, 0.5).
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof builds upon the proof of Be`nabou and Ok
(2001, Theorem 2), with a few changes. For any η ∈ (ymin, y¯) and α ∈ [0, 1],
define a family of piecewise linear income transition functions as follows:
(A1) sη,α(y) := min{y, η + α(y − η)}
Each sη,α is continuous, strictly increasing, and concave. Since G is right-skewed,
y¯ > µG, and so sµG,α, transition function relative to the median, is also in the
family defined by (A1). The τ -th iteration of sη,α represents gross income after
τ periods of redistribution, and is given by
(A2) (sη,α)
τ (y) = min{y, η + ατ (y − η)} ≡ sη,ατ (y)
Clearly, for α = 0 and α = 1, the transition function stays the same after any
number of iterations. This will simplify expected utility comparisons when sη,1
and sη,0 are used.
Suppose a transition function s is used, then the expected utility of an individual
with initial income y after T periods under laissez-faire policy r0 is
V T (s(y)) :=
T∑
τ=0
δτsτ (y),
and under the full redistribution policy r1, when every individual receives the
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same income, it is
W T (s) :=
T∑
τ=0
δτ y¯τ =
∫ ymax
ymin
V T (s(y))dG(y),
where y¯0 = y¯. The second equality holds since the redistribution in each period
has to satisfy the budget-balance constraint.
Suppose transition function sη,1 is used. The expected utility of an individual
with initial income η after T periods under r0 is
(A3) V T (sη,1(η)) =
T∑
τ=0
δτη <
T∑
τ=0
δτ y¯ = W T (sη,1) ,
since η < y¯. Thus, if the transition function is sη,1, any individual with initial
income below the average strictly prefers r1 to r0.
Now, suppose transition function sη,0 is used. The expected utility of an indi-
vidual with initial income η after T periods under r0 is strictly greater than under
r1 if and only if
V T (sη,0(η)) > W
T (sη,0)(A4)
m
η +
T∑
τ=1
δτη > y¯ +
T∑
τ=1
δτ
∫ ymax
ymin
min{y, η}dG(y)
m
y¯ − η
η − ∫ ymaxymin min{y, η}dG(y) <
T∑
τ=1
δτ =
δ(1− δT )
1− δ
m
y¯ − η
η − ∫ ηymin ydG(y)− η(1−G(η)) <
δ(1− δT )
1− δ
m
y¯ − η
ηG(η)− ∫ ηymin ydG(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Q(η)
<
δ(1− δT )
1− δ(A5)
Since dQ(η)dη = −
y¯G(η)−∫ ηymin ydG(y)(
ηG(η)−∫ ηymin ydG(y))2 < 0, Q is continuous and strictly decreasing
in η for η < y¯. Therefore, if (A5) holds for η = µG, it also holds for any
24
η ∈ (µG, y¯). At η = µG, (A5) is equivalent to
y¯ − µG
µG − 2 ∫ µGymin ydG(y) <
δ(1− δT )
2(1− δ)
m
y¯ − µG
µG − y˜ − 1 <
δ(1− δT )
2(1− δ) − 1(A6)
where y˜ := 2
∫ µG
ymin
ydG(y) < µG. This condition for the median voter income is
implicitly invoked in the proof of Be`nabou and Ok (2001, Theorem 2), and it is
guaranteed to hold by choosing a sufficiently large T and δ close to 1. Comparing
the left hand side of (A6) with λp¯(G) ≡ y¯−µGµG−µGp¯ − 1, we see that the two coincide
if and only if y˜ = µGp¯ ; for y˜ > µ
G
p¯ , λp¯(G) <
y¯−µG
µG−y˜ − 1; and for y˜ < µGp¯ , λp¯(G) >
y¯−µG
µG−y˜ − 1. Therefore, for y˜ ≤ µGp¯ , as guaranteed by (7), (8) implies (A6) (and for
y˜ ≥ µGp¯ , (A6) implies (8), so if we are allowed to choose T and δ, we don’t need
to impose an extra condition on the degree of skewness).
Thus, we have established that (A5) holds for any η ∈ [µG, y¯), which implies
(A7) W T (sη,1) > V
T (sη,1(η)) =
T∑
τ=0
δτη = V T (sη,0(η)) > W
T (sη,0) .
Since by construction, W T (sη,α) is continuous and strictly increasing in α, there
exists a unique α(η) ∈ (0, 1) such that W T (sη,α(η)) = ∑Tτ=0 δτη, so that the agent
with initial income η is indifferent between r0 and r1. Under sη,α(η) and r0, any
agent with y < η receives y in every period τ , while an agent with y > η receives
η + ατ (y − η) > η. Therefore, η separates those who support r0 (richer voters)
from those who support r1 (poorer voters), under transition function sη,α(η). This
holds for any η ∈ [µG, y¯), and, in particular, for the median voter. Increasing T
will push the cutoff income of those in support of r0 below η, as proved in Be`nabou
and Ok (2001, Theorem 2(a)), resolving the median voter’s indifference in favor
of r0.
Proof of Proposition 3. To prove the first part, note that since t is convex, F c-
precedes G. Since quantile measure of skewness satisfies (A1), λp(F )−λp(G) ≤ 0
for any p ∈ (0, 0.5), in particular, for p = p¯. Hence t is progressive in terms of
skewness by Definition 4.
To prove the second part, note that if t is convex, then t′(y) is increasing in y.
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t is progressive by Definition 3 if and only if
d(t(y)/y)
dy
=
t′(y)y − t(y)
y2
=
t′(y)
y
− t(y)
y2
> 0⇔ t′(y) > t(y)
y
By the mean value theorem, for any y ∈ (ymin, ymax)
∃ y˜ ∈ (ymin, y) : t′(y˜) = t(y)− t(ymin)
y − ymin
By convexity of t, t′(y) > t′(y˜) for y > y˜. Combining, and using the assumption
that t(ymin) ≤ 0 and ymin > 0,
t′(y) > t′(y˜) =
t(y)− t(ymin)
y − ymin >
t(y)− t(ymin)
y
≥ t(y)
y
Hence t is progressive by Definition 3.
Appendix B. Numerical computations
In this Appendix, we demonstrate some properties of the quantile measure of
skewness when applied to three families of standard distributions: exponential,
lognormal and Pareto. Assume that the tax functional is given by
H(y, α) = y − y
2
3ymax
+ αθ,
where θ is the average tax and α is “efficiency” (how much of the tax return is
redistributed as a lump-sum transfer to the households).
We start with an exponential distribution, truncated from both sides at ymin
and ymax. Its pdf is
g(y) = ` exp(−`y) I(ymin,ymax)(y)
G˜(ymax)− G˜(ymin)
,
where I(a,b)(y) = 1 if a < y < b and 0 otherwise, G˜(·) is the cdf of the non-
truncated exponential distribution with support (0,+∞), and ` is the parameter
of the truncated exponential.
Table B1 presents the computation results, and Figure B1 illustrates them
graphically.
Next, we look at the lognormal distribution. Its pdf is
g(y) =
exp− (ln(y)−m)2
2σ2√
2piσy
I(ymin,ymax)(y)
G˜(ymax)− G˜(ymin)
,
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The upper left figure shows gross income
(the diagonal) and net income, tax (includ-
ing transfers), and lump sum transfer as func-
tions of gross income. The upper right fig-
ure depicts gross and net income density over
gross income support. The vertical lines, from
left to right, are gross income quantiles at p¯
(p¯-quantile), 0.5 (median income), and 1 − p¯
(mean), respectively. Note that the horizon-
tal axis refers to gross income in the first case
and to net income in the second. The lower
figure depicts quantile measures of skewness,
λp(G) (solid line) and λp(F ) (dashed line) as
functions of the skewness parameter p. The
vertical line represents p¯. For parameters see
Table B1.
Figure B1. : Exponential Distribution
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Table B1—: Numerical Results: Exponential Distribution
Gross Income Net Income
` 0.0017 0.0011
Max 1000 704
Min 50 87
Mean 400 362
Median 348 346
p¯-Quantile 300 309
Conditional Mean 304 —
Variance 65988 31114
Transfer — 38
Skewness 0.090 0.041
Notes. Efficiency: α = 0.50; p¯ = 0.44.
where G˜(·) is the cdf of the non-truncated lognormal distribution with support
(0,+∞), m and σ are the parameters of the truncated lognormal. The estimation
results are given in Table B2 and illustrated by Figure B2.
Table B2—: Numerical Results: Lognormal Distribution
Gross Income Net Income
m 5.9168 5.9054
σ 0.5776 0.4645
Max 1000 700
Min 50 82
Mean 400 367
Median 360 350
p¯-Quantile 323 322
Conditional Mean 263
Variance 40000 18775
Transfer — 33
Skewness 0.101 0.066
Notes. Efficiency: α = 0.50: p¯ = 0.42.
Finally, we turn to the Pareto distribution. Its pdf is
f(y) = ρ
yρmin
yρ+1
I(ymin,ymax)(y)
G˜(ymax)
,
where G˜(·) is the cdf of the non-truncated Pareto distribution with support
[ymin,+∞), and ρ and ymin are the parameters of the truncated Pareto. Esti-
mation results are given in Table B3 and illustrated by Figure B3.
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The upper left figure shows gross income
(the diagonal) and net income, tax (includ-
ing transfers), and lump sum transfer as func-
tions of gross income. The upper right fig-
ure depicts gross and net income density over
gross income support. The vertical lines, from
left to right, are gross income quantiles at p¯
(p¯-quantile), 0.5 (median income), and 1 − p¯
(mean), respectively. Note that the horizon-
tal axis refers to gross income in the first case
and to net income in the second. The lower
figure depicts quantile measures of skewness,
λp(G) (solid line) and λp(F ) (dashed line) as
functions of the skewness parameter p. The
vertical line represents p¯. For parameters see
Table B2.
Figure B2. : Lognormal Distribution
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The upper left figure shows gross income
(the diagonal) and net income, tax (includ-
ing transfers), and lump sum transfer as func-
tions of gross income. The upper right fig-
ure depicts gross and net income density over
gross income support. The vertical lines, from
left to right, are gross income quantiles at p¯
(p¯-quantile), 0.5 (median income), and 1 − p¯
(mean), respectively. Note that the horizon-
tal axis refers to gross income in the first case
and to net income in the second. The lower
figure depicts quantile measures of skewness,
λp(G) (solid line) and λp(F ) (dashed line) as
functions of the skewness parameter p. The
vertical line represents p¯. For parameters see
Table B3.
Figure B3. : Pareto Distribution
30
Table B3—: Numerical Results: Pareto Distribution
Gross Income Net Income
ρ 1.1483 1.7124
Max 1000 674
Min 50 56
Mean 143 113
Median 89 83
p¯-Quantile 65 67
Conditional Mean 109 —
Transfer — 7
Skewness 1.319 1.092
Notes. Efficiency: α = 0.50; p¯ = 0.27.
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Appendix C. Income distributions and quantile measures of skewness:
additional data (for online publication)
C1. Household data
Figures C1 – C8 that follow, cover UK data from 1979 to 2010.
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C1. : Household data, UK’79
32
0.0E+00
3.0E-05
6.0E-05
9.0E-05
1.2E-04
1.5E-04
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000
Gross Income Net Income
(a) Gross and Net Income Distribution
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
𝜆p
p
Gross Income Net Income
(b) Quantile Skewness
Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C2. : Household data, UK’86
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C3. : Household data, UK’91
34
0.0E+00
2.0E-05
4.0E-05
6.0E-05
8.0E-05
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000
Gross Income Net Income
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C4. : Household data, UK’95
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C5. : Household data, UK’99
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C6. : Household data, UK’04
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C7. : Household data, UK’07
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C8. : Household data, UK’10
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Table C1—: Gross income distributions over time, household data.
Gross Income (G)
Skewness Conditional
Year Parameter Mean Median p¯-Quantile Mean
p¯ µG1−p¯ µG µGp¯
1979 0.439 6,158 5,563 4,950 2,949
1986 0.402 11,360 9,307 7,289 5,078
1991 0.395 17,676 14,075 10,742 7,296
1995 0.386 20,095 15,546 11,361 8,282
1999 0.373 24,677 18,483 13,426 10,177
2004 0.367 31,146 23,400 17,181 13,214
2007 0.367 34,354 25,869 19,015 14,486
2010 0.355 36,147 26,754 19,602 15,552
2013 0.362 38,913 29,328 22,035 17,077
Table C2—: Net income distribution over time, household data.
Net Income (F )
Year Skewness Mean 1− p¯- Median p¯-Quantile
Parameter Quantile
p¯ x¯ µF1−p¯ µF µFp¯
1979 0.439 4,942 4,943 4,496 4,038
1986 0.402 8,909 8,929 5,073 6,217
1991 0.395 13,571 13,586 7,717 8,897
1995 0.386 15,740 15,659 8,784 9,722
1999 0.373 19,620 19,630 10,875 11,615
2004 0.367 24,827 24,666 13,674 14,653
2007 0.367 28,485 28,703 16,241 17,277
2010 0.355 29,894 30,247 16,955 18,036
2013 0.362 32,564 32,934 18,260 20,206
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Table C3—: Gross and net income skewness over time, household data.
Year Skewness Quantile Skewness Mean over Relative Relative
Parameter Gross Net Median Income Income
Income (G) Income (F ) Excess Shortfall
p¯ λp¯(G) λp¯(F ) m
G 1− µGp¯ /µG µG1−p¯/µG − 1
1979 0.439 -0.029 -0.024 1.107 0.110 0.107
1986 0.402 0.017 0.033 1.175 0.217 0.221
1991 0.395 0.080 0.108 1.207 0.237 0.256
1995 0.386 0.087 0.136 1.213 0.269 0.293
1999 0.373 0.225 0.270 1.253 0.274 0.335
2004 0.367 0.246 0.230 1.266 0.266 0.331
2007 0.367 0.238 0.181 1.251 0.265 0.328
2010 0.355 0.313 0.310 1.270 0.267 0.351
2013 0.362 0.314 0.261 1.275 0.249 0.327
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C2. Equivalized data
Figures C9 – C17 that follow, cover UK data from 1979 to 2013. Equivalence
scale is n−0.5.
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C9. : Equivalized data, UK’79
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C10. : Equivalized data, UK’86
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C11. : Equivalized data, UK’91
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C12. : Equivalized data, UK’95
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C13. : Equivalized data, UK’99
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C14. : Equivalized data, UK’04
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C15. : Equivalized data, UK’07
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C16. : Equivalized data, UK’10
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Notes. The top panel depicts gross and net income density over gross
income support. The horizontal axis is truncated after the 95% gross
income percentile. The vertical lines, from left to right, are gross income
quantiles at p¯, 0.5 (median income), and 1− p¯, respectively. The bottom
panel depicts quantile measures of skewness, λp(G) and λp(F ) as functions
of p. The vertical line represents p¯.
Figure C17. : Equivalized data, UK’13
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Figure C18. : Quantile Skewness and Demand for Redistribution
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Figure C19. : Condition (7) for POUM hypothesis holds in equivalized data
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Figure C20. : Tax progression over time
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Table C4—: Gross income distributions over time, equivalized data.
Gross Income (G)
Skewness Conditional
Year Parameter Mean Median p¯-Quantile Mean
p¯ µG1−p¯ µG µGp¯
1979 0.431 3,964 3,588 3,253 2,295
1986 0.403 7,438 6,332 5,392 3,916
1991 0.391 11,920 9,875 7,935 5,759
1995 0.392 13,434 11,079 8,743 6,359
1999 0.372 16,785 13,400 10,425 8,024
2004 0.362 21,374 16,890 13,135 10,467
2007 0.372 23,820 19,044 15,074 11,625
2010 0.361 25,094 19,752 15,507 12,425
2013 0.362 26,761 20,990 16,536 13,364
Table C5—: Net income distributions over time, equivalized data.
Net Income (F )
Skewness
Year Parameter Mean 1− p¯-Quantile Median p¯-Quantile
p¯ µF1−p¯ µF µFp¯
1979 0.431 3,177 3,157 2,887 2,658
1986 0.403 5,812 5,844 5,073 4,420
1991 0.391 9,125 9,088 7,717 6,444
1995 0.392 10,503 10,447 8,784 7,229
1999 0.372 13,319 13,297 10,875 8,760
2004 0.362 17,038 16,855 13,674 11,071
2007 0.372 19,645 19,666 16,241 13,353
2010 0.361 20,680 20,639 16,955 13,880
2013 0.362 22,344 22,449 18,260 14,982
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Table C6—: Gross and net income skewness over time, equivalized data.
Skewness Quantile Skewness Mean over Relative Relative
Parameter Gross Net Median Income Income
Income (G) Income (F ) Excess Shortfall
p¯ λp¯(G) λp¯(F ) m
G 1− µGp¯ /µG µG1−p¯/µG − 1
1979 0.431 0.125 0.174 1.105 0.093 0.105
1986 0.403 0.176 0.181 1.175 0.149 0.175
1991 0.391 0.054 0.077 1.207 0.196 0.207
1995 0.392 0.008 0.069 1.213 0.211 0.213
1999 0.372 0.138 0.146 1.253 0.222 0.253
2004 0.362 0.194 0.222 1.266 0.222 0.266
2007 0.372 0.203 0.186 1.251 0.208 0.251
2010 0.361 0.258 0.198 1.270 0.215 0.270
2013 0.362 0.296 0.278 1.275 0.212 0.275
